In 2014 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €20 banknote.
Non-technical summary
Mutual funds are one of the most widespread investment vehicle worldwide and it is therefore important to understand the determinants of mutual funds investors'behaviour.
In this paper, we study to what extent they take into account mutual funds'taxation.
Theoretically, the e¤ects of reduced taxation on asset demand are ambiguous: a decrease in the tax rate on the returns of a given asset tends to increase its average net return (with a positive e¤ect on the asset's demand), but also the variability of returns (which has a negative e¤ect). The cross-e¤ect of a change in taxation of a given asset on other assets' demand is also ambiguous.
In this paper, we try to identify the impact of a change in the tax burden on mutual funds'in ‡ows, exploiting a switch from an accrual-based to a realization-based tax regime enacted in Italy in July 2011. Under the …rst regime the increase in the value of a share of the fund is taxed when it occurs; under the second, the capital gain is taxed only when the share is sold and the gain is cashed by the investor. Ceteris paribus, taxation on a realization basis amounts to a reduction in the net discounted value of the tax burden, as the tax payment is deferred. For our purposes, a crucial element of the Italian reform is that before its introduction the mutual funds based in Italy were taxed on accrual basis while those based abroad were taxed on a realization basis. Starting from July 2011 both types of mutual funds are taxed on a realization basis. Therefore, the reform concerned only a subset of the funds available in the Italian market and this allows us to use funds sponsored by foreign companies as a control group.
In the analysis we consider open-end harmonized funds (i.e. those established and managed in accordance with the EU rules and regulations) and we use monthly data from supervisory reports of the Bank of Italy and from the Morningstar database. In particular, we rely on information communicated by asset management companies to the Bank of Italy for purchases, redemptions and assets under management relative to Italian holders. This source is quite valuable since it allows us to focus on Italian investors, who are subject to the tax reform, excluding shares held by foreign investors. Data on returns -before and after 1 taxes -and on the investment specialization of each fund come instead from Morningstar.
Our baseline analysis is conducted on equity funds, which represent about 20% of the whole Italian mutual funds market. The sample consists of 116 Italian funds (the treatment group) and 259 foreign funds (the control group), divided among 52 di¤erent fund families.
In some robustness exercises, we consider a much wider sample (albeit on a quarterly instead of a monthly frequency), including basically all Italian mutual funds and the majority of foreign funds marketed in Italy (three quarters of the total in terms of assets held by Italian residents).
Given our quasi-experimental set-up, we can make resort to di¤erence-in-di¤erences techniques in order to identify the causal e¤ect of the tax change. We also use matching techniques, which allow for non-linear as well as heterogeneous treatment e¤ects across mutual funds. In some regressions we allow for the presence of substitution e¤ects between treated and control funds.
Our results indicate that -controlling for returns, risk, and other fund-speci…c characteristics -the switch from an accrual-based to a realization-based tax regime led to an increase in the net in ‡ows for the treated funds, relative to non-treated ones, which is both economically and statistically signi…cant. The increase is robust to di¤erent identi…cation assumptions, estimation windows, and speci…cations. Our analysis suggests that the regime change (which can be estimated as equivalent to a 1 percentage point reduction in the tax burden for the treated funds) has increased the ratio of monthly net in ‡ows to assets of the treated funds, relative to the control group, by about 2 percentage points. Moreover, we found no evidence that the increase in the demand for Italian funds came at the expense of foreign funds.
Introduction

1
Mutual funds are one of the biggest investment vehicles worldwide. In the US, their assets amount to about 37% of GDP and 11% of households' …nancial portfolios. Even in the euro area, where they are relatively less developed, their importance is far from negligible (they account for 13% of GDP and 7% of households'…nancial assets).
It is therefore important to understand how mutual funds investors behave. The considerable exant literature sheds light on several issues 2 . We know, for example, that investors tend to chase past fund performance (see e. g. Gruber, 1996 and Sirri and Tufano, 1998) ; avoid funds with high fees (Sirri and Tufano, 1998, Barber et al., 2005) ; and prefer funds which are more "visible", due to media coverage or to the size of the fund's family (Sirri and Tufano, 1998, Jain and Wu, 2000) . There is also evidence that distribution channels matter: ‡ows to funds distributed through captive brokers are less sensitive to expenses (Christo¤ersen et al., forthcoming) 3 .
There is comparatively much less research on how investors take into account mutual funds'taxation, which is the topic of the present paper.
The e¤ects of reduced taxation on asset demand are theoretically ambiguous (Stiglitz, 1969) . A decrease in the tax rate on the returns of a given asset tends to increase its average net return (with a positive e¤ect on the demand for the same asset), but also the variability of returns (which has the opposite e¤ect). 4 The cross-e¤ect of a change in taxation of a given asset on other assets'demand is also ambiguous (Sandmo, 1977) .
In this paper, we study in particular the e¤ects on funds' ‡ows of a switch from an accrual-based to a realization-based tax regime. Under the …rst regime, the increase in the value of a share of the fund is taxed when the rise in value occurs. Under the second, it is 1 The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ‡ect those of the Bank of Italy. We would like to thank Dimitris Christelis, Giorgio Gobbi, Sandro Momigliano, Marcin Kacperczyk, Alessandro Rota, and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the ECB, the Annual Congress of the European Economic Association and the Annual Congress of the Italian Public Economics Society for their useful comments and suggestions.
2 For a survey, see Zheng (2008) . 3 By contrast, the distribution channel does not seem to in ‡uence the ‡ow-performance relationship (Bergstresser et al., 2009) . 4 The Government will in fact bear an increased share of potential losses as well as potential gains.
3 taxed only when the share is sold. Ceteris paribus, taxation on a realization basis amounts to a reduction in the net discounted value of the tax burden, as the tax payment is deferred.
To measure the e¤ect of the switch to realization-based taxation we exploit a reform enacted in Italy in July 2011. For our purpose, a crucial element of this reform is that it concerned only a subset of the funds available in the Italian market, namely those sponsored by asset management companies based in Italy. This allows us to use funds sponsored by foreign companies as a control group.
To give a preview of our results, we …nd that the regime change (which can be estimated as equivalent to a 1 percentage point reduction in the tax burden for the treated funds) has had a signi…cant and positive impact on the ratio of monthly net in ‡ows to assets of the treated funds, increasing them by about 2 percentage points.
Our paper adds to a small set of previous contributions, all concerned with the US market. The paper most closely related to ours is that by Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) which is, to our knowledge, the only one to address directly the relationship between a fund's tax burden and a fund's in ‡ows. In particular, they regress the latter on the former and on several other factors that can in ‡uence investor behavior, using a repeated crosssection of US funds, and …nd that the relationship is negative and statistically signi…cant.
This suggests that investors are aware that funds returns are dented by taxes, and that tax considerations play a role in determining their choices. With respect to this seminal paper, the main di¤erence in our analysis is that we exploit a quasi-experimental policy change instead of using a more standard regression-based approach. This should provide a more clear-cut identi…cation of the relationship between taxation and fund ‡ows. Ivkovic and Weisbrenner (2009) A partially related literature investigates whether mutual fund managers consider taxes in their choices. Barclay et al. (1998) , Christo¤ersen et al. (2005) and Sialm and Starks (2012) show that funds with a clientele of mostly taxable investors have a higher propensity to realize losses and a lower propensity to distribute gains (another instance of the abovementioned lock-in e¤ect). By showing that mutual fund managers care about taxes, these contributions provide indirect evidence that mutual fund investors care about taxes too.
The possibility of tax deferral applies to several …nancial instruments and not just mutual funds. Turning to common stock investors, one should mention the notable studies by Barber and Odean (2004) and Ivkovic et al. (2005) . 5 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the characteristics of the Italian mutual funds market, and describes in detail the quasi-natural experiment which is at the core of our analysis. Section 3 we describes the data. In Section 4 we discuss our empirical strategy and give our results. Section 5 concludes. Table 1 gives an overview of the Italian mutual funds market structure. As of 2011,
Italian investors held open-end mutual funds shares valued at about e425 billion euros (12% of total households' …nancial assets or almost 30% of GDP). Italian mutual funds i.e. funds sponsored by asset management companies based in Italy, represent about 35% of this pie; the remaider is invested in foreign funds i.e. funds sponsored by companies based abroad. Foreign funds sponsored by companies incorporated abroad but owned by
Italian intermediaries account in turn for 65% of all foreign funds. Many asset management companies, both Italian and foreign, are held by Italian banking groups (they account for about 80% of total net assets). 6
Mutual funds are open both to households and to institutional investors. Based on the information that the Bank of Italy collects on the assets under deposit with Italian banks, it appears that the share held by households is roughly the same in Italian and foreign funds:
in 2011 it was respectively 72% and 69% (Table 2) .
Before the 2011 reform, Italian investors holding shares of an Italian mutual fund were subject to a substitute tax at a rate of 12.5%, levied on the yearly change in the value of the fund's portfolio (net of the value of subscriptions and redemptions; so-called "risultato di gestione"). The tax was paid by the fund itself once a year. No tax applied to investors upon collection of the income from the fund or redemption of fund shares. The tax regime for domestic mutual funds was therefore completely based on the accruals method. In case of negative returns, losses could be used to o¤set the funds' future gains (for up to four years). 7
By contrast, if an Italian investor held shares of a foreign fund 8 , the 12.5% tax rate had to be paid by the Italian investor upon receipt of the income from the distribution or sale of the fund's shares (realization method ). In this case too, capital losses could be used by 6 A yearly outlook on the developements of the Italian mutual fund industry can be found in the Bank of Italy's Annual Reports.
7 Or they could be used to o¤set a positive result of other funds managed by the same company (see Savona, 2006) . 8 The regime applies to harmonized funds, i.e. those funds established and managed in accordance with the EU rules and regulations on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).
6 the investor to o¤set other capital gains for the next four years.
As argued in the previous section, these tax rules, and in particular the impossibility of tax deferral, implied ceteris paribus a higher tax burden with respect to a foreign fund, putting Italian funds at a disadvantage vis à vis their foreign competitors.
The new law was passed in January 2011 and took e¤ect from the following July. 9 From that momoent onwards, the taxation of Italian funds changed from annual taxation levied on the accrued returns to a tax levied on the investor upon receipt of the income, eliminating any tax asymmetry with respect to foreign funds.
The gains of the reform in terms of reduced taxation depends on the expected distribution of the net returns of the investment and from the expected holding period. If one assumes that expected before-tax returns for Italian equity mutual funds are equal to the average over the 1990-2011 period (about 5,5% per year), and that the holding period is equal to that observed in the past (5 years) it turns out that the reform is equivalent to a reduction in the tax rate on yearly returns of about 1 percentage point, from 12.5 to 11.5%. 10
The Dataset
We collected monthly data from supervisory reports to the Bank of Italy and the Morningstar database. In particular, we rely on information communicated by asset management companies to the Bank of Italy for purchases, redemptions and assets under management relative to Italian subscribers. This information is quite unique since it allows us to focus on Italian investors/taxpayers, excluding shares held by foreign investors. 11 Data on returns -before and after taxes -and on the investment specialization of each fund come instead 9 Law n.10/2011. 1 0 The computation is done using the method proposed by Poterba (2002a Poterba ( , 2004 , which abstracts from uncertainty. Namely, we …nd the such that:
where r is the average long-run rate of return, is the post-reform tax rate on realized capital gains, and T is the holding period. 1 1 In principle all UCITS funds can be traded in Italy, but we consider only those whose shares are actually held by Italian investors. 7 from the Morningstar database.
Our initial dataset includes all the Italian funds and a wide sample of foreign funds (amounting to three quarters of all foreign funds' assets held by Italian residents). We consider open-end harmonized funds i.e. those established and managed in accordance with the EU rules and regulations. 12 For the sake of comparability, in most of the paper we follow the other studies discussed in the introduction and limit our analysis to equity funds, which represent about 20% of the whole Italian mutual funds market (however, in Section 4.1 we also show some sensitivity analyses in which the full sample is considered).
We also exclude funds with less than e1 million of assets under management and those that registered net ‡ows greater in absolute value than 50 per cent of their net assets in a single month. 13 We also exclude sector and country funds. Their investment strategies focus on very speci…c asset classes, and they are usually subscribed by institutional investors that are subject to a distinctive tax regime. Indeed, corporations -as opposed to individualscan choose to receive mutual funds'earnings gross of taxes and to pay taxes on their total net income, instead of being subject to the substitute taxation.
Our …nal sample consists of 116 Italian funds (the treatment group) and 259 foreign funds (the control group), divided among 52 di¤erent fund families and belonging to the following categories: European funds (of which 40 belonging to the treatment group and 68 to the control group), American funds (18 and 49), International funds (27 and 38), and Paci…c or Emerging Markets funds (31 and 104). Italian funds tend to be bigger than foreign funds (in the sex months preceding the reform the former had assets amounting to e170 billion on average, against e126 billion for the foreign funds). On average, both returns and volatility were rather similar across the two groups. Summary statistics are reported in Tables 3 and 4. As discussed above, the tax regimes of Italian and foreign funds di¤ered until June and were aligned after that date, when Italian funds changed from an accrual-basis to a 1 2 See footnote 7. Speci…cally we exclude exchange-traded, funds of funds and hedge funds. While only 85% of Italian funds are UCITS, foreign funds marketed to Italian investors are almost exclusively harmonized funds (UCITS).
1 3 Funds on the verge of being liquidated could report huge out ‡ows, which would skew the analysis. average treatment e¤ect on the treated.
In our baseline estimation (Table 5 , column 2) the impact of the treatment is positive and amounts to about 1,8 percentage points of the assets, on a monthly basis. Table 5 shows that the estimate is largely stable for di¤erent speci…cations of model (1). In particular, results analogous to the baseline estimate are obtained using a more parsimonious speci…cation -substituting the full set of time dummies with just the P ost t variable (column 1) -and also including in the regression the 52 fund families as further controls (column 3).
The result does not change if we use the Jensen alpha -a more accurate proxy of performance -instead of returns and their standard deviations (column 4) 14 or if we do not normalize our dependent variable dividing it by the size of the fund (Table 6 ). 15 We also experiment with di¤erent time windows (Table 7 , columns 1 and 2). First, we restrict the sample to the three months before and the three months after the change.
Second, we extend the pre-treatment period up to January 2010. In both cases the e¤ect of the tax-regime change appears strongly statistically signi…cant. In the former, it is somewhat larger than in our baseline estimate (2.4% instead of 1.8%) in the latter it is slightly lower (1.5%).
A further set of sensitivity analyses concerns the extension of the sample of funds considered. First, we enlarge the sample to include country and sector equity funds. As a second step, we consider an even larger sample, including also bond and mixed (bond and equity) funds, for a total of 3203 funds (as mentioned in Section 4, this represents basically 100% of all Italian funds and three-quarters of all foreign funds). To build this sample, we have to rely on Assogestioni data, which are released on a quarterly, not monthly, basis. In both cases, the baseline estimates are substantially con…rmed (Table 7 , respectively columns 5 and 6).
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are potentially exposed to the econometric problems 1 4 The Jensen alpha is computed from a standard Capital Asset Pricing Model regression in which the fund's extra-return with respect to the risk-free rate is regressed against a constant (the Jensen's alpha) and the extra-return of the category to which the fund belongs (European, American, etc.). See Cesari and Panetta (2002) for a more detailed analysis of Italian funds 'performance.
1 5 In order to tackle scale problems we consider instead the hyperbolic sine of net in ‡ows (the log transformation is obviously not viable as net ‡ows can take negative values). The coe¢ cient of the interaction term can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity with respect to the change in the tax regime.
highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004) , namely a tendency (due to correlated residuals) to …nd a signi…cant treatment e¤ect even when there is none, because the standard deviation of the estimators is underestimated. However, to avoid this problem we adopted several precautions. First, all our inferences are done using standard errors clustered at the fund's level. Moreover, we checked that the treatment e¤ect is signi…cant at 1% even if errors are clustered at the group level, i.e. distinguishing Italian from Foreign funds 16 (Table 8, column 1).
The statistical signi…cance of the treatment e¤ect remains very high even when the standard errors are clustered in di¤erent ways (Table 8, 
Assessing the common trend assumption
The di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach relies on the assumption that, without the treatment, the change in the outcome variable for the treated population would have been the same as the change observed for the control group, conditional on the control variables (common trend assumption). The common trend assumption is not directly testable, as it relies on a counter-factual scenario. However, we can indirectly assess its plausibility. A simple eyeball test in our case does not seem inconsistent with the assumption, looking at net in ‡ows normalized by the fund's size (Figure 1 ) or at the residual of the regression of net in ‡ows with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of returns (Figure 2 ). In this section we discuss the issue more formally.
As a …rst check, we conduct a battery of "placebo" experiments, testing whether a signi…cant di¤erence in the dynamics of in ‡ows between foreign and domestic funds appeared even in periods in which the treatment did not take place (in other words, we assessed the e¤ects of several "mock reforms"). The evidence supports the common trend assumption at least until the …rst quarter of 2011 (see Figure 3) . The fact that the treatment e¤ect starts to appear slightly signi…cant a few months before the change became e¤ective might signal an anticipation e¤ect. As we discussed above, the law which changed the tax regime for the Italian funds was passed at the beginning of January, even if the change took place in the following July. 17 If anything, this should strengthen our case for a positive impact of the tax change on impact.
Another set of "placebo" experiments is performed using only foreign (i.e. non-treated) funds. Namely, we pick at random a subset of them and pretend that they are treated; we then run our baseline regression using this fake treatment group. The empirical distribution of the estimate of the interaction term, shown in Figure 4 , correctly suggests that the placebo treatment has no e¤ect.
As a further check, we address the concern that Italian intermediaries providing both Italian and foreign funds might have changed their marketing strategies at the same time of the reform, therefore inducing a violation of the common trend assumption. This might be in some way due to the increased funding di¢ culties experienced by some banks (which are among the most important fund promoters) around mid-2011. While there is no evidence, either formal or anecdotal, that this is the case (in particular, it does not appear that Italian intermediaries started pushing Italian funds more aggressively than foreign funds), to be on the safe side we repeat our baseline estimation excluding from the sample all foreign funds sponsored by Italian groups. Reassuringly, the results don't change (Table 7 , column 3).
Similarly, we repeat our exercise excluding from the sample those funds (be they foreign or domestic) that were sponsored by one of the …ve top Italian banking groups, which were those that experienced the more severe deterioration in funding conditions (Table 7 , column 4). Also in this case, our results hold.
Finally, we estimate a di¤erence-in-di¤erence model for all the controls we have used in the baseline model. None of the controls appears to be in ‡uenced in a statistically relevant way by the reform, in fact the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is never statistically di¤erent from zero.
Allowing for substitution e¤ects
In principle, the change in the taxation of Italian funds (the treatment group) might have in ‡uenced the demand for foreign mutual funds (the control group). In fact following the reform some investors may have decided to move part of their savings from foreign mutual funds to Italian ones. If this is so, our estimates would encompass the e¤ect of the tax change on both on the demand for Italian funds and on that for foreign funds. Moreover, the presence of a substitution e¤ect would violate the assumptions of the (simplest version of the) di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology. To obtain a consistent estimate of the direct e¤ect of taxation on the demand for Italian mutual funds in the presence of a substitution e¤ect between the two groups, we have to modify our di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy.
In this section we follow Miguel and Kremer (2004) , and adopt a procedure which doesn't require the no-substitution assumption. We assume, instead, that there is a sostitution e¤ect but one that for each fund it is limited to a subset of funds which are more similar (its "reference group"). In other words, within the class of foreign funds (the control group) the change of taxation for Italian funds (the treatment group) has an e¤ect which depends on (a measure of) similarity/substitutability among funds. Based on this weaker assumption, we include two more regressors in the baseline regression: the total number of mutual funds belonging to fund i's reference group and the number of treated funds belonging to fund i 's reference group. As for the reference groups, we adopt the Morningstar clusters, which are built by looking at similarity along four dimensions: asset class, investment style, geographic and sector specialization.
The results of this richer regression (Table 9 , column 1) are very similar to those of our baseline regression, suggesting that the substitution e¤ect did not play an important role. This may not be surprising, given that only a relatively small fraction of the wealth of Italian households is invested in equity funds (the resources to increase households'investments in Italian mutual funds could therefore be easily found elsewhere). 18 1 8 Moreover, the overall amount of available resources is obviously not …xed: it can be increased by 13 Some asset management group sponsors mutual funds with the same asset allocation but with a di¤erent domicile. We exploit this peculiarity of the Italian mutual funds industry for a further robustness check. In particular, for each fund we de…ne as its reference group the mutual funds which have the same Morningstar classi…cation and are run by asset management companies belonging to the same group (Table 9 , column 2). Even in this case, the results are very similar to our baseline, again suggesting that the e¤ect of the treatment on the control group is negligible. Other ways to build the reference groups yield similar results too (Table 9 , columns 3 and 4).
Matching estimators
Another set of estimators which do not require the common trend assumption to hold is provided by matching estimators. They rest on the assumption that the e¤ect of the treatment will be the same both for the treated and for the non-treated population, conditional on the included controls (unconfoundedness assumption). As remarked, among others, by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Lechner (2011) , neither the common trend assumption nor the unconfoundedness assumption implies the other. In particular, contrary to the matching approach, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is correct in the case of unobserved timeinvarying variables. However, given the panel nature of our data, we have the possibility of including the pre-treatment outcome (i.e. Inf low it 1 ) among the regressors. This goes a long way towards controlling for unobservables, and increases the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption. On this basis, the matching approach is often deemed preferable to di¤erence-in-di¤erences when panel data are concerned (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ).
The matching approach has two further advantages with respect to the di¤erence-indi¤erences estimator: …rst, it is fully non-parametric, so it does not assume linearity of the treatment e¤ect; second, it allows for heterogeneous treatment e¤ects.
Therefore, in this section we complement the analysis of Section 4.1 by computing two quite standard matching estimators (in both cases, we consider a T = 2 panel in which variables are averaged over the pre-treatment and the post-treatment period, respectively).
increasing the saving rate.
The …rst is a propensity score matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . To compute it, we …rst estimate the propensity score of each observation using a probit in which the dependent variable is the treatment dummy, and the independent variables are lagged in ‡ows, returns, and volatility; then, each observation is associated to one group of observations or "stratum", so that the average propensity score of the treated and the nontreated within each group/stratum is the same. 19 For each stratum, the average di¤erence in the di¤erence in in ‡ows between Italian and foreign funds is computed; the estimator of the average treatment e¤ect is the across-strata average of this magnitude. More formally (denoting by the set of all strata S, by j:j the number of elements of a set, and by N the set of all observed funds), we have:
The estimated treatment e¤ect obtained with this methodology (^ ) is in line with the one obtained with di¤erence-in-di¤erences and highly statistically signi…cant (Table 10 , column 1).
The second estimator that we compute is a pairwise-matching estimator. We match each treated fund with the most similar one among the non-treated, compute the di¤erence-indi¤erences between each treated fund and its non-treated counterpart, and …nally average across all the treated funds. In symbols, this amounts to the following estimator:
where M (i) denotes the non-treated unit matched to the treated unit i. The similarity is judged by considering the same covariates that we used in the case of the propensity score matching, therefore pre-treatment in ‡ows are also considered. The result is similar in size to the one obtained using a propensity score, and it is again highly signi…cant (Table 10, columns 2 and 3). 20
As a …nal exercise, we compute the Athey and Imbens (2006) changes-in-changes estimator, which also allows for heterogeneous and non-linear treatment e¤ects. Incidentally, we notice that the estimator proposed by Athey and Imbens allows for the treatment to in ‡uence the outcome of the control groups. Hence it can be used to tackle the issue related to the presence of a substitution e¤ect among the two sets of funds, discussed in Section 4.3. Table 10 (column 4) reports the results of the changes-in-changes estimation. Our main result is again con…rmed: the average e¤ect of the reform for Italian mutual funds is positive and statistically signi…cant.
Conclusions
In this paper we use a new method to identify the impact of a change in the tax burden on mutual funds'in ‡ows, exploiting a switch from an accrual-based to a realization-based tax regime. In particular, we take advantage of a quasi-natural experiment due to a tax reform enacted in Italy in 2011.
Our results indicate that there is an increase in the net in ‡ows for the treated funds which is both economically and statistically signi…cant, as well as robust to di¤erent identi…cation assumptions, estimation windows, and speci…cations. Moreover, we found no evidence that the increase in the demand for Italian funds came at the expense of foreign funds.
Before concluding, we would like to stress that our results do not mean that the reform was welfare-enhancing. Indeed, while the development of the institutional investors' industry in non Anglo-Saxon countries is often seen as a policy priority, this objective can be pursued by other means as well. Resorting to the taxation lever entails costs for the public budget. It would be interesting to compute these costs and to arrive at a full- ‡edged Note: We run the baseline regression considering only foreign funds and randomly assigning them to the treated group. We run this exercise 1000 times and plot the distribution of the obtained point estimate. Sources: Bank of Italy and Assogestioni.
(1) Domestic funds are defined as those run by asset management companies based in Italy. (2) Foreign funds are defined as those run by a foreign asset management company. (1) (1) (1) (4) Variables averaged over the 6 months before and after July 1, respectively (Bertrand et al., 2004) . (5) GLS. Table 9 : Di¤-in-di¤ regressions: allowing for substitution e¤ects.
(1) Note: In all regressions robust standard errors are used, clustered at individual fund level. For each fund, the reference group is given by all the funds with: (1) the same Morningstar classification; (2) the same Morningstar classification and belonging to the same family; (3) the same investment area; (4) the same investment area and belonging to the same family. Table 10 : Matching estimates and Changes-In-Changes estimates.
(1) 
